FinancialCrime.org conducts independent investigations into systemic misconduct by financial institutions, cryptocurrency businesses, brokers, custodians, and other intermediaries — with a particular focus in recent years on crypto exchanges, dark web laundering infrastructure, and digital asset service providers. The investigations published here are a small subset of the cases we have worked on — the ones where the terms of resolution permitted us to discuss the findings in anonymised form.

Many of our investigations remain entirely confidential. They span areas including crypto swapping and mixing services, exchange compliance failures, escrow and trust companies, wealth advisory firms, custody banks, brokerage execution practices, and institutional fiduciary arrangements. In several cases, our work led directly to regulatory action, corporate settlements, and material changes in how the firms in question operate. Those outcomes are documented in regulatory files and settlement agreements, not on this page.

What we publish here follows a consistent methodology: identify a pattern across multiple clients or counterparties, quantify the harm, build a regulator-ready evidentiary file, and — once the matter is resolved — write up the case in enough detail that compliance professionals, regulators, and affected individuals can learn from it. Names and identifying details are changed. The mechanics, the evidence trail, and the outcomes are real.

If you have information about conduct that looks systemic — the same harm, repeated the same way, across multiple customers — we would like to hear about it.

Our Current Investigation

ACTIVE INVESTIGATION: Following the Float: Inside an Investigation Into Escrow Disbursement Delays

Over 100 independent complaints across a dozen platforms describe the same experience with a major U.S.-licensed online escrow company: funds held for weeks or months after all conditions are met, untraceable payment references, and shifting explanations. We tested the popular float theory against nine years of audited financial data. The numbers don't support it — but what they do show may be more troubling.

Our Past Investigations

The Rollover Machine: How a “Fiduciary” Advisory Firm Engineered Annuity Sales

A retired actuary noticed that every client file from the same advisory firm told the same story: roll your retirement plan into an IRA, buy an indexed annuity, lock up your money. The firm's risk-scoring tool almost always produced the same recommendation — regardless of the client's actual circumstances. We reverse-engineered the tool, built the regulatory case across 43 client files, and forced a $49 million settlement. This is how it worked.

The One-Way Latency Valve: How We Proved a Broker Was Systematically Skimming Client Trades

A retail trader noticed that his losing trades executed instantly while his winning trades seemed to hang. We built a six-week controlled experiment across five brokers, placed hundreds of trades around volatility events, and proved the asymmetry was real. Then we found the affiliated counterparty on the other side. This is how we built the case.

The Fee-Only Firm That Wasn’t: How We Uncovered Three Hidden Revenue Streams at a...

A retired surgeon asked a forensic account reviewer to look at his late sister's investment statements. What started as a routine review of one client's accounts became a two-month investigation across 19 accounts, revealing a fiduciary advisory firm that had quietly become conflicted while still describing itself as clean. This is the story of how we built a regulator-ready case — and what happened when we filed it.

How a Custody Bank Turned Pension Securities Lending Into a Three-Layer Revenue Machine

A teachers' pension fund asked me to review its securities lending income. What I found was a custody bank that had converted a client-risk programme into a multi-layered revenue channel: lending agent fees, affiliate collateral-fund management fees, and cash-management spreads — while showing trustees only the top-line number. One pension plan had explicitly barred affiliate reinvestment. The bank did it anyway for 14 consecutive quarters.

Verified Crypto Accounts for Sale: A Dark Web Investigation

FinancialCrime.org investigators spent several months monitoring cybercriminal forums and Telegram channels where verified crypto exchange and banking accounts are openly traded. What we found is a mature, structured marketplace that directly undermines the KYC and AML controls the industry depends on — with accounts available for as little as $20.

How Criminals Cash Out Dirty Crypto: A Dark Web Manual Dissected

During dark web monitoring for a FinancialCrime.org investigation, I discovered what the Russian-language cybercriminal underground describes as the "most complete manual for withdrawing crypto that does not pass AML verification." This article dissects the manual step by step, evaluates each technique against current AML tools, and explains what compliance teams should be watching for.